Q1  I (T)C(P) You (su20-final-q7)  (26 points)

EvanBot builds a new course feature that sends announcements to students over TCP. To receive announcements, a student initiates a TCP connection with the server. The server sends the announcements and terminates the connection.

Q1.1 (3 points) Assuming that no adversaries are present, which of the following does communication over a TCP connection guarantee? Select all that apply.

☐ (A) That both the server and client can detect if a particular announcement needs to be resent

☐ (B) That different announcements are delivered in the same order they were sent in

☐ (C) That announcements are delivered using the most efficient path through the internet

☐ (D) None of the above

☐ (E) ——

☐ (F) ——

Q1.2 (3 points) When only an on-path adversary is present, which of the following does communication over a TCP connection guarantee? Select all that apply.

☐ (G) That both the server and client can detect if a particular announcement needs to be resent

☐ (H) That different announcements are delivered in the same order they were sent in

☐ (I) That announcements are delivered using the most efficient path through the internet

☐ (J) None of the above

☐ (K) ——

☐ (L) ——
Q1.3  (3 points) Suppose that EvanBot instead sends announcements over UDP. Assuming that no
adversaries are present, which of the following might happen? Select all that apply.

- [ ] (A) Students might not receive some announcements
- [ ] (B) Students might receive the announcements more quickly
- [ ] (C) The server might not detect some errors which it would have had it been using TCP
- [ ] (D) None of the above

EvanBot realizes that the server is sending messages to the student, but the student only responds
with ACKs and never sends any messages after the initial handshake. They design a *Half TCP* protocol
which provides TCP’s properties for communications from the server to the student, but not for
communications from the student to the server. This is accomplished using a modified version of the
standard three step handshake pictured below.

Q1.4  (5 points) Some sequence numbers are no longer necessary in *Half TCP*. Which fields do not
need to be transmitted? Select all that apply.

- [ ] (G) The sequence number in the SYN packet
- [ ] (H) The sequence number in the SYN-ACK packet
- [ ] (I) The ACK number in the SYN-ACK packet
- [ ] (J) The sequence number in the ACK packet
- [ ] (K) The ACK number in the ACK packet
- [ ] (L) None of the above
Q1.5 (3 points) Which of these are consequences of moving from TCP to Half TCP for this application? Select all that apply.

- (A) The student will no longer receive announcements in the correct order
- (B) The server will not have to keep track of as much state
- (C) The student will not have to keep track of as much state
- (D) None of the above
- (E) —
- (F) —

The 161 staff likes security and decides to use TLS over Half TCP. Assume that the staff server has a valid certificate for their public key.

For each different adversary below, select all attacks which become easier when running TLS over Half TCP compared to normal TCP.

Q1.6 (3 points) Off-path adversary

- (G) RST Injection Attack
- (H) Interfere with a TLS handshake to learn the master key
- (I) Replay an encrypted command from a previous TLS connection
- (J) None of the above
- (K) —
- (L) —

Q1.7 (3 points) On-path adversary

- (A) RST Injection Attack
- (B) Interfere with a TLS handshake to learn the master key
- (C) Replay an encrypted command from a previous TLS connection
- (D) None of the above
- (E) —
- (F) —
Q1.8  (3 points) Man-in-the-middle adversary

☐ (G) RST Injection Attack

☐ (H) Interfere with a TLS handshake to learn the master key

☐ (I) Replay an encrypted command from a previous TLS connection

☐ (J) None of the above

☐ (K) ——

☐ (L) ——
Q2 Mutuality (sp21-final-q9) (18 points)

Recall the TLS handshake:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>1. ClientHello</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. ServerHello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. ServerKeyExchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. ServerHelloDone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. ClientKeyExchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. ChangeCipherSpec, Finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. ChangeCipherSpec, Finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Application Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Application Data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Server</th>
<th>1. Client sends 256-bit random number $R_b$ and supported ciphers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Server sends 256-bit random number $R_s$ and chosen cipher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Server sends certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. DH: Server sends ${g, p, g^a \mod p}<em>{K</em>{server}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Server signals end of handshake</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|        | 6. DH: Client sends $g^b \mod p$  
|        | RSA: Client sends $\{PS\}_{K_{server}}$  
|        | Client and server derive cipher keys $C_b, C_s$ and integrity keys $I_b, I_s$ from $R_b, R_s, PS$ |
|        | 7. Client sends MAC(dialog, $I_b$) |
|        | 8. Server sends MAC(dialog, $I_s$) |
|        | 9. Client data takes the form $\{M_1, MAC(M_1, I_b)\}_{C_b}$ |
|        | 10. Server data takes the form $\{M_2, MAC(M_2, I_s)\}_{C_s}$ |

In TLS, we verify the identity of the server, but not the client. How would we modify TLS to also verify the identity of the client?

Clarification during exam: All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

Q2.1 (3 points) Which of these additional values should the client send to the server?

- (A) A certificate with the client’s public key, signed by the client’s private key
- (B) A certificate with the client’s public key, signed by the server’s private key
- (C) A certificate with the client’s private key, signed by a certificate authority’s private key
- (D) A certificate with the client’s public key, signed by a certificate authority’s private key
- (E) ——
- (F) ——
Q2.2 (3 points) How should the client send the premaster secret in RSA TLS?

- (G) Encrypted with the server’s public key, signed by the client’s private key
- (H) Encrypted with the client’s public key, signed by the server’s private key
- (I) Encrypted with the server’s public key, signed by a certificate authority’s private key
- (J) Encrypted with the client’s public key, signed by a certificate authority’s private key
- (K) __________
- (L) __________

Q2.3 (3 points) EvanBot argues that the key exchange protocol in Diffie-Hellman TLS doesn’t need to be changed to support client validation. Is EvanBot right?

- (A) Yes, because only the client knows the secret $a$, so the server can be sure it’s talking to the legitimate client
- (B) Yes, because the server has already received and verified the client’s certificate
- (C) No, the client must additionally sign their part of the Diffie-Hellman exchange with the client’s private key
- (D) No, the client must additionally sign their part of the Diffie-Hellman exchange with the certificate authority’s private key
- (E) __________
- (F) __________

Q2.4 (2 points) True or False: The server can be sure that they’re talking to the client (and not an attacker impersonating the client) immediately after the client and server exchange certificates.

- (G) True
- (H) False
- (I) __________
- (J) __________
- (K) __________
- (L) __________

Q2.5 (3 points) At what step in the TLS handshake can both the client and server be sure that they have derived the same symmetric keys?

- (A) Immediately after the TCP handshake, before the TLS handshake starts
- (B) Immediately after the ClientHello and ServerHello are sent
- (C) Immediately after the client and server exchange certificates
- (D) Immediately after the client and server verify signatures
- (E) Immediately after the MACs are exchanged and verified
- (F) __________
Q2.6 (4 points) Which of these keys, if stolen individually, would allow the attacker to impersonate the client? Select all that apply.

☐ (G) Private key of a certificate authority

☐ (H) Private key of the client

☐ (I) Private key of the server

☐ (J) Public key of a certificate authority

☐ (K) None of the above

☐ (L) ___
Q3  I Love You 3000 (sp22-final-q11)  (18 points)

Tony wants to send a message, \( M \), to his daughter, Morgan. The message is split across 3 packets, \( M_1 \), \( M_2 \), and \( M_3 \). Assume that both Tony and Morgan will use the modified version of TCP specified in each subpart. Each subpart is independent.

Q3.1 (3 points) Consider a modified version of TCP where Morgan no longer sends an ACK to Tony. If Tony sends \( M \) using this modified version of TCP and \( M_2 \) was dropped during delivery, then which of the following are true?

- \( M_2 \) will be resent until it is received by Morgan.
- Morgan will be able to notice that \( M_2 \) is lost.
- Morgan will be able to reconstruct \( M \) even if \( M_2 \) is not resent.
- None of the above

Q3.2 (3 points) Consider a modified version of TCP where Tony no longer sends an ACK to Morgan. If Tony sends \( M \) using this modified version of TCP and \( M_2 \) was dropped during delivery, then which of the following are true?

- \( M_2 \) will be resent until it is received by Morgan.
- Morgan will be able to notice that \( M_2 \) is lost.
- Morgan will be able to reconstruct \( M \) even if \( M_2 \) is not resent.
- None of the above
Q3.3 (6 points) Consider a modified version of TCP where Tony and Morgan have the same ISN (Initial Sequence Number). Assume all adversaries can spoof packets. Which of the following is true about the resulting connection?

- It is possible for an adversary who can see only packets sent by Tony to spoof more than one message from Tony to Morgan without being detected by either party.
- It is possible for an adversary who can see only packets sent by Morgan to spoof more than one message from Tony to Morgan without being detected by either party.
- It is possible for an adversary who can see only packets sent by Tony to spoof only one message from Tony to Morgan without being detected by either party.
- It is possible for an adversary who can see only packets sent by Morgan to spoof only one message from Tony to Morgan without being detected by either party.
- An in-path attacker can spoof more than one message from Tony to Morgan without being detected by either party.
- An on-path attacker can spoof more than one message from Tony to Morgan without being detected by either party only if their message arrives before Tony’s message.
- None of the above

For the following subparts, for each modification to TLS, select all true statements. Each subpart is independent.

Q3.4 (3 points) The digital signature algorithm used to create the certificate is forgeable.

- A MITM attacker can impersonate the server to the client.
- An on-path attacker can read messages.
- None of the above

Q3.5 (3 points) In RSA TLS, the RSA encryption algorithm has a backdoor that lets anyone decrypt the ciphertext without the private key.

- A MITM attacker can impersonate the server to the client.
- An on-path attacker can read messages.
- None of the above