Question 1  Software Vulnerabilities

For the following code, assume an attacker can control the value of basket, n, and owner_name passed into search_basket.

This code contains several security vulnerabilities. **Circle three such vulnerabilities** in the code and briefly explain each of the three on the next page.

```c
struct cat {
    char name[64];
    char owner[64];
    int age;
};

/* Searches through a BASKET of cats of length N (N should be less than 32). Adopts all cats with age less than 12 (kittens). Adopted kittens have their owner name overwritten with OWNER_NAME. Returns the number of kittens adopted. */
size_t search_basket(struct cat *basket, int n, char *owner_name) {
    struct cat kittens[32];
    size_t num_kittens = 0;
    if (n > 32) return -1;
    for (size_t i = 0; i <= n; i++) {
        if (basket[i].age < 12) {
            /* Reassign the owner name. */
            strcpy(basket[i].owner, owner_name);
            /* Copy the kitten from the basket. */
            kittens[num_kittens] = basket[i];
            num_kittens++;
            /* Print helpful message. */
            printf("Adopting kitten: ");
            printf(basket[i].name);
            printf("\n");
        }
    }
    /* Adopt kittens. */
    adopt_kittens(kittens, num_kittens); // Implementation not shown
    return num_kittens;
}
```
1. Explanation:

**Solution:** Line 12 has a fencepost error: the conditional test should be \( i < n \) rather than \( i \leq n \). The test at line 11 assures that \( n \) doesn’t exceed 32, but if it’s equal to 32, and if all of the cats in basket are kittens, then the assignment at line 17 will write past the end of kittens, representing a buffer overflow vulnerability.

2. Explanation:

**Solution:** At line 12, we are checking if \( i \leq n \). \( i \) is an unsigned int and \( n \) is a signed int, so during the comparison \( n \) is cast to an unsigned int. We can pass in a value such as \( n = -1 \) and this would be cast to 0xffffffff which allows the for loop to keep going and write past the buffer.

3. Explanation:

**Solution:** On line 15 there is a call to strcpy which writes the contents of owner\_name, which is controlled by the attacker, into the owner instance variable of the cat struct. There are no checks that the length of the destination buffer is greater than or equal to the source buffer owner\_name and therefore the buffer can be overflown.

**Solution:** Another possible solution is that on line 21 there is a printf call which prints the value stored in the name instance variable of the cat struct. This input is controlled by the attacker and is therefore subject to format string vulnerabilities since the attacker could assign the cats names with string formats in them.

Some more minor issues concern the name strings in basket possibly not being correctly terminated with '\0' characters, which could lead to reading of memory outside of basket at line 21.

Describe how an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to obtain a shell:

**Solution:** Each vulnerability could lead to code execution. An attacker could also use the fencepost or the bound-checking error to overwrite the RIP and execute arbitrary code.
Question 2  Echo, Echo, Echo

Consider the following vulnerable C code:

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

char name[32];

void echo(void) {
    char echo_str[16];
    printf("What do you want me to echo back?\n");
    gets(echo_str);
    printf("%s\n", echo_str);
}

int main(void) {
    printf("What’s your name?\n");
    fread(name, 1, 32, stdin);
    printf("Hi %s\n", name);

    while (1) {
        echo();
    }

    return 0;
}
```

Assume you are on a little-endian 32-bit x86 system. Assume that there is no compiler padding or additional saved registers in all questions.
Q2.1 (5 min) Assume that non-executable pages are enabled so we cannot execute SHELLCODE on stack. We would like to exploit the `system(char *command)` function to start a shell. This function executes the string pointed to by `command` as a shell command. For example, `system("ls")` will list files in the current directory.

Construct an input to `gets` that would cause the program to execute the function call `system("sh")`. Assume that the address of `system` is `0xdeadbeef` and that the address of the RIP of `echo` is `0x9ff61fc4`. Write your answer in Python syntax (like in Project 1).

**Hint:** Recall that a return-to-libc attack relies on setting up the stack so that, when the program pops off and jumps to the RIP, the stack is set up in a way that looks like the function was called with a particular argument.

**Solution:** Our goal is to make `echo` return to the `system` function by changing the RIP of `echo` to the address of `system`. When `echo` returns to `system`, the stack should look like the stack diagram below, because by calling convention the callee expects its arguments and its RIP to be pushed onto the stack by the caller. It's the callee's responsibility to push the SFP onto the stack as its first step.

Therefore we need to first place garbage bytes from the beginning of `name` up to the RIP of `echo` (`'A' * 20`) and replace the RIP of `echo` with the address of `system` (`'\xef\xbe\xad\xde'`) so that `echo` will return to `system`. Now, we want to create the stack diagram above to make the stack in line with what the `system` method expects. Thus, we add four bytes of garbage where the `system` method expects RIP of `system` to be. Note that, RIP of `system` is the address that `system` method will return to. Then, we place the address of "sh" at the location where `system` expects an argument, and place the string "sh" at that location (which is 8 bytes above the RIP of `system`).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>command (pointer to &quot;sh&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected) RIP of system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As such, our exploit may look something like the following:

```
'A' * 20 + '\xef\xbe\xad\xde' + 'B' * 4 + '\xd0\xf1\xf6\x9f' + 'sh' + '\x00'
```

**NOTE:** Since the stack below the RIP of `echo` will get invalidated (because it's below the ESP) after `echo` returns, we cannot make any assumptions about whether the values placed there would remain as is. Therefore, you should not place the string "sh" in `name`. 

Q2.2  (6 min) Assume that, in addition to non-executable pages, ASLR is also enabled. However, addresses of global variables are not randomized.

Is it still possible to exploit this program and execute malicious shellcode?

- (G) Yes, because you can find the address of both name and system
- (H) Yes, because ASLR preserves the relative ordering of items on the stack
- (I) No, because non-executable pages means that you can’t start a shell
- (J) No, because ASLR will randomize the code section of memory

**Solution:** If ASLR is enabled, the address of system, a line of code in the code section of memory, will be randomized each time the program is run. Because our exploit uses this address, ASLR will effectively prevent us from using our approach!
Question 3  Hacked EvanBot

Hacked EvanBot is running code to violate students’ privacy, and it’s up to you to disable it before it’s too late!

```c
#include <stdio.h>

void spy_on_students(void) {
    char buffer[16];
    fread(buffer, 1, 24, stdin);
}

int main() {
    spy_on_students();
    return 0;
}
```

The shutdown code for Hacked EvanBot is located at address 0xdeadbeef, but there’s just one problem—Bot has learned a new memory safety defense. Before returning from a function, it will check that its saved return address (rip) is not 0xdeadbeef, and throw an error if the rip is 0xdeadbeef.

Clarification during exam: Assume little-endian x86 for all questions.

Assume all x86 instructions are 8 bytes long. Assume all compiler optimizations and buffer overflow defenses are disabled.

The address of buffer is 0xbffff110.

Q3.1 (3 points) In the next 3 subparts, you’ll supply a malicious input to the fread call at line 5 that causes the program to execute instructions at 0xdeadbeef, without overwriting the rip with the value 0xdeadbeef.

The first part of your input should be a single assembly instruction. What is the instruction? x86 pseudocode or a brief description of what the instruction should do (5 words max) is fine.

**Solution:** jmp *0xdeadbeef

You can’t overwrite the rip with 0xdeadbeef, but you can still overwrite the rip to point at arbitrary instructions located somewhere else. The idea here is to overwrite the rip to execute instructions in the buffer, and write a single jump instruction that starts executing code at 0xdeadbeef.

Grading: most likely all or nothing, with some leniency as long as you mention something about jumping to address 0xdeadbeef. We will consider alternate solutions, though.

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1 In practice, x86 instructions are variable-length.
Q3.2 (3 points) The second part of your input should be some garbage bytes. How many garbage bytes do you need to write?

- (G) 0
- (H) 4
- (I) 8
- (J) 12
- (K) 16
- (L) __________

**Solution:** After the 8-byte instruction from the previous part, we need another 8 bytes to fill buffer, and then another 4 bytes to overwrite the sfp, for a total of 12 garbage bytes.

Q3.3 (3 points) What are the last 4 bytes of your input? Write your answer in Project 1 Python syntax, e.g. `\x12\x34\x56\x78`.

**Solution:** \x10\x01\xff\xbf

This is the address of the jump instruction at the beginning of buffer. (The address may be slightly different on randomized versions of this exam.)

Partial credit for writing the address backwards.

Q3.4 (3 points) When does your exploit start executing instructions at 0xdeadbeef?

- (G) Immediately when the program starts
- (H) When the main function returns
- (I) When the spy_on_students function returns
- (J) When the fread function returns
- (K) __________
- (L) __________

**Solution:** The exploit overwrites the rip of spy_on_students, so when the spy_on_students function returns, the program will jump to the overwritten rip and start executing arbitrary instructions.